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Abstract 
Since the 1990s, governments around the world have emphasized the core concepts of 
globalization. Many governments initiated a series of political policies regarding 
liberalization and privatization in response to the inevitable phenomenon. In Southeast 
Asia, Thailand participated in the development as well by reconstructing its financial 
system to allow greater foreign capital for investments. Unfortunately, the importance 
of prudential regulations was underestimated, and the neglect thereafter caused the 
Asian Financial Crisis which initially occurred in Thailand on the second of June, 1997. 
The Thai government received 17.2 billion US dollars from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to stabilize its domestic situation and implemented structural reform to 
minimize losses from the crisis. Meanwhile, different voices regarding the policies for 
globalization were expressed. These opinions mainly referred to regionalization/ 
regionalism and localization/ localism. This study discusses how the Thai state 
transformed under globalization from three industries: the Telecommunication 
industry, the Automobile industry, and the Cultural Creative industry. This article 
observes that Thailand turned to take regionalization and localization into 
consideration, which in turn demanded the state to increase domestic autonomy and 
capacity. The findings also suggest that cooperation with other governments in the 
region to accelerate economic recovery from the crisis was inevitable. However, political 
instability and close state-business relations continue to make the future of Thailand 
uncertain. 
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Introduction 
The Asian financial crisis in 1997 not 
only caused severe damages to the Thai 
economy, the event also caused Prime 
Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (New 
Aspiration Party) to step down from 
office and the succession of Chuan 
Leekpai (Democrat Party) as leader of the 
government. Once in office, Chuan 
carried out globalization and 
liberalization policies and accepted great 
assistance from the IMF, World Bank and 
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other international organizations, in the 
hope of leading the Thai people out of the 
shadow of financial crisis with speed. 
However, such unconditional 
liberalization policy generated significant 
repercussions from the Thai people. It 
was under such condition that 
telecommunication tycoon Thaksin 
Shinawatra grasped the heart of the 
Thailand people and established the Thai 
Rak Thai Party in 1998.  
In the 2001 general election, 
Thaksin’s policy appeal to nationalist and 
populist sentiments enabled him to defeat 
the Democrat Party and become the 
twenty-third PM of Thailand. Not only 
did Thaksin implement many populist 
policies after entering office, under the 
suggestion of renowned business 
strategist Michael Porter and others, 
Thaksin selected five industries as his key 
policy focus: tourism, fashion, food, 
software and automobile (Ketels 2003; 
Porter 2003). The fashion, food and 
software industries are closely related 
with the cultural creative industry. The 
cultural creative and automobile 
industries thus became important 
windows for Thailand to respond to the 
globalization crisis through 
regionalization and localization. 
Based on the examples of the 
telecommunication, the automobile and 
the cultural creative industry, this paper 
seeks to analyze the changing role of the 
Thai state under globalization. This paper 
argues that after Thailand’s confrontation 
with the globalization crisis, the country 
turned to emphasize regionalization and 
localization. Through economic 
cooperation and integration with other 
countries in the region, and improvement 
in the state’s institutional autonomy and 
capacity, the Thai government brought 
related industries onto the path of 
economic recovery. However, Thailand’s 
political instability in recent years and 
corrupt state-business relations continue 
to make the future of Thailand uncertain. 
The structure of this paper is as 
follows: section one is the introduction; 
section two introduces the changing role 
of the Thai state, including 
regionalization, localization and state-
business relations; section three provides 
a brief introduction of Thailand’s 
automobile, cultural creative and 
telecommunication industries; section 
four uses the automobile industry to 
explain Thailand’s regionalization 
strategy; section five uses the cultural 
creative industry to explain how Thailand 
responds to globalization through 
localization; section six explains how 
Thailand exploits state-business relations 
to buffer its telecommunication industry 
and the negative impacts of political 
instability on related industries; section 
seven is the conclusion. 
Changing Role of the State 
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After the publication of Bringing the 
State Back In in 1989, the state became the 
focus of political and economic research 
(Evans, Rueschemeyer & Skocpol, 1985). 
At the same time, the wave of 
globalization began to emerge and caused 
great impact on the state. The zero-sum 
framework of thinking of academics 
regarding the relationship between 
globalization and the state began to 
change. The academia began to 
emphasize the “enabling face of 
globalization”, which includes: (1) the 
increasing sense of economic insecurity, 
which demands the government to 
provide social security; (2) increased 
competition among states, which 
demands the government to provide 
more mechanisms for the creation of 
industries; (3) intensified competition 
among key industries, which demands 
the government to respond with new 
policies, strengthen supervision 
mechanisms and carry out structural 
reforms (Weiss 2003, pp.15-18). 
In order to break away from the zero-
sum framework of thinking regarding 
globalization, when analyzing the 
phenomenon so called “globalization”, 
we must emphasize the research 
approach of domestic institution. The 
challenges of globalization and economic 
liberalization do not deny the importance 
of domestic institution. Rather, Deyo(1996, 
p.136) argues that we must place more 
importance on the regulatory capacity 
and organization structure of domestic 
institution because they can increase the 
state capacity against globalization. It is 
easy to see that globalization has caused 
local companies to face severe 
competition and influenced state capacity 
in many ways. State capacity is therefore 
the variable that best explains the 
differences among industries of different 
states in a globalized age (Evans 1997). 
The Emergence of Regionalization 
In the Fifth WTO Ministerial Meeting 
of the Doha Round held in Cancun in 
2003, as a result of the inability to reach 
consensus and ensuing deadlock 
regarding the issue of agriculture, many 
states turned to the negotiation of 
regional trade agreements (RTAs). 
Regionalism has become a very important 
concept of the international system today 
(Dent 2008, p.6). Regionalism can be 
divided into two categories: open 
regionalism and closed regionalism. 
Open regionalism emphasizes the 
relationship between the state and the 
global market and regards regionalization 
as a complementary stage that supports 
state participation in the process of 
globalization. The regionalizing process 
can be considered as meso-globalization 
or a transitional phase before 
globalization. In short, regionalization 
should not be seen as contradictory to 
globalization (Munakata 2005, p.16). 
Open regionalism can be further divided 
into two branches: neoliberal regionalism 
and the FDI model. The FDI model 
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emphasizes the importance of foreign 
direct investment for regionalization. 
Closed regionalism focuses on the 
relationship between the state and society 
and places importance on distributional 
or social justice and other non-economic 
values. This category of regionalism 
considers the regionalizing process as an 
oppositional force against globalization. 
Legitimacy is an important basis for 
decision makers when accessing 
regionalism. Closed regionalism is also 
divided into two branches: 
developmental regionalism and the 
resistance model. Developmental 
regionalism places emphasis on the 
importance of domestic capital 
(Nesadurai 2003a, 2003b). 
Under the influence of globalization, 
transnational corporations grew on a 
massive scale and entered into 
developing economies. Southeast Asia 
became the main target of transnational 
corporations. In order to counter the 
negative impacts of globalization, East 
Asian countries adopted regional 
cooperation (Munakata 2005, p.38). 
Thailand adopted the response of closed 
regionalism but does not shut out 
globalization completely. Developmental 
regionalism best explains the condition of 
Thailand. 
The Response of Localization 
In Thailand, the debate between 
globalization and localization has existed 
for a long time, especially after the Asian 
financial crisis (Hamilton-Hart 1999). 
After the Asian financial crisis, Chuan 
accepted the suggestions of IMF and 
carried out privatization, liberalization 
and other reforms. However, these 
reforms did not realize without negative 
consequences. Many of Thailand’s 
important companies fell into foreign 
ownership, which generated great 
discontent among the Thai population. 
In the birthday speech in 1997, the 
King pointed out the importance of the 
sufficiency economy based on the 
individual, the family and the state. He 
pointed out that by carrying out 
sufficiency, not only can the country 
reduce the influences of both the domestic 
and international market, Thailand could 
also decide on whether to connect with 
the world or not, and not be forced into 
the international market and free trade by 
globalization (Hamilton-Hart 1999, 2000; 
Hewison 2000). The call for sufficiency 
garnered great support in less developed 
rural areas in Thailand’s northern and 
northeastern regions. As a result, Chuan 
was forced to step down from office in 
2001 and hand over power to the Chiang 
Mai born Thaksin. 
Keeping in mind the discontent IMF 
reform policies have generated in the past, 
Thaksin shifted the tone of his economic 
policy from market liberalization and 
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globalization to an emphasis on 
localization (Hewison 2000), a policy later 
known as “Thakinomics.” Thaksin’s main 
argument was dual-track: the first track 
emphasizes the influence of FDI on 
Thailand’s economic development; the 
second track emphasizes the importance 
of the domestic market. Such local based 
policy thinking effectively improved the 
capacity and autonomy of the Thai 
government while the economy quickly 
recovered. Populist localization became 
an effective weapon against globalization.  
The example of Thailand suggests 
that the Thai government and the state’s 
role were indeed affected by the 
negative impacts of globalization, which 
indirectly led to the eventual outburst of 
the 1997 financial crisis. Yet after the 
crisis, the government and the role of the 
state began to undergo change. The Thai 
government adopted a more active 
response towards globalization. By 
guiding the development of the 
automobile and cultural creative 
industries and integrating the forces of 
regionalization and localization, the Thai 
government successfully overcame the 
challenges of globalization.  
Besides the response of 
regionalization and localization, Thaksin 
also exploited traditional state-business 
relations to support specific industries 
and facilitate Thailand’s economic 
recovery. 
State-Business Relations in the Thaksin Era 
Thaksin, born on July 26, 1949 in 
Chiang Mai, is a fourth generation 
Chinese immigrant. The second and third 
generation ancestors of the Thaksin 
family engaged in the textile industry in 
the Chiang Mai area as early as 1932, 
hence it is little wonder that Thaksin 
inherited the business acumen of his 
family. After receiving his doctorate in 
criminal justice at Sam Houston State 
University in Texas in 1979, Thaksin 
returned to Thailand and became a police 
officer. Thaksin started a small computer 
dealership and used his father-in-law’s 
connections in the Thai police force to 
expand his business effectively in the 
early eighties. After achieving business 
success through connections in the police 
force, Thaksin gained a deep 
understanding of the importance of state-
business relations. 
On July 14, 1998, Thaksin established 
the Thai Rak Thai Party. It was the first 
time in Thailand’s political history that 
such an influential corporate figure enters 
into politics. Thaksin entered the 2001 
general election and announced his 
ambition to rule the country -- Thailand 
officially entered the Thaksin era. 
Thaksin’s victory in the election not only 
symbolized the re-emergence of business 
interests, the new leader’s business 
background and his corporate relations 
also changed the essence of state-business 
relations completely, moving Thailand 
from money politics in the period of 
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democratization to “big money politics” 
(Baker  2005, p.130). Thailand’s new 
leader was able to maintain close relations 
with both international and domestic 
capital. Thaksin’s rule reflects the 
importance of the network between the 
state and business. However, close state-
business relations generated popular 
discontent and repulse in the end and 
sparked Thailand’s first military coup 
since 1992. 
The Political Economy of Industries in 
Thailand 
The Automobile Industry 
Import Substitution Period (1961-1971) 
Before the 1960s, Thailand imported 
all its automobiles (Niyomsilpa 2008). In 
order to develop its own automobile 
industry, the Thai government passed the 
Industrial Promotion Act in 1960 (Doner 
1987, p.415). The IPA provided incentive 
for investment and in the same year the 
IPA was introduced, several automobile 
assembly plants obtained licenses. In 1961, 
the first automobile assembly plant in 
Thailand, Anglo Thai Motor, was 
officially established. In the first year of 
implementation of the IPA, 310 passenger 
cars and 215 trucks assembled 
(Poapongsakorn & Techakanont 2008, 
p.203; Terdudomtham 1997, p.3). 
However, Thailand’s import substitution 
policy in this period was unsuccessful. 
The increase in automobile import caused 
acute trade deficit. The Thai government 
was forced to change its policy and adopt 
a more rigid stance against foreign 
investment. In 1972, Thailand passed 
related laws to limit the influence of 
foreign capital on the Thai economy 
(Kesavatana 1989, p.107-112). 
1. Protectionism Period (1971-1991) 
In 1971, the Thai government 
established the Automobile Industry 
Development Committee (AIDC) under 
the Ministry of Industry, in the hope of 
facilitating the growth of the automobile 
industry through state assistance. 
Accordingly, the Thai government 
announced a series of policies geared 
towards the automobile industry. By 1975, 
all assembled parts should reach 25% of 
local content ratio, which means that at 
least 25% of all parts used should be 
made in Thailand. In 1978, the Thai 
government further adopted a more 
protectionist policy. However, 
protectionism increased production cost 
and decreased the quality of the 
automobile in Thailand. The high price of 
automobile greatly affected the sale of 
vehicles in Thailand and even drove away 
foreign corporations such as GM Holden 
and Chrysler/Dodge from the country 
(Lim & Fong 1991, p.153-154), planting 
the seed for the next round of reforms. 
Liberalization Period (1991-1997) 
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After the military coup in February 
1991, Anand Panyarachun  succeeded as 
Thailand’s eighteenth Prime Minister. The 
new administration decided to liberalize 
Thailand’s automobile industry in order 
to lower the domestic sale price of the 
automobile and increase the sector’s 
competitiveness in the world (Higashi 
1995). The first step the Anand 
administration undertook was to lift the 
import ban on Complete-Built-Unit (CBU) 
in April 1991 and lower both the tariffs 
for CBU and Complete-Knock-Down 
(CKD) in July of the same year. In this 
period, Thailand’s industrial policy in 
terms of the automobile basically 
corresponds to the development of 
globalization. The automobile industry 
began to be internationalized in this 
period. However, Thailand’s policy 
autonomy was relatively low and 
measures and policies corresponding to 
the new development remained 
insufficient. In addition, the Thailand 
government relaxed the threshold on 
foreign shareholding in the same period, 
which caused most of the country’s 
automobile plants to fall into foreign 
ownership, particularly Japanese 
ownership, at the end of the 1990s 
(Fuangkajonsak 2006). The policy change 
greatly affected Thailand’s national 
interest and generated serious problems 
in 1997.  
Post-crisis Period (1997- present) 
The Asian financial crisis had a major 
impact on Thailand’s automobile industry. 
Thailand’s automobile market shrunk 
40% while car sales plummeted from 
561,523 in 1996 to 349,033 in 1997. By 1998, 
the sale figure for automobiles reached 
only 140,402, achieving only 1/4 of the 
sale figure in 1996. In order to resuscitate 
the dying automobile industry, the Thai 
government undertook a series of 
liberalization policies. The government 
reinforced cooperation between the state 
and the private sector to promote the 
development of the automobile industry 
and improve its global competitiveness 
(Thailand Automobile Institute 2006). The 
automobile industry began to show signs 
of life again thanks to appropriate state 
policies and Thailand’s activeness in 
entering economic cooperation in East 
Asia. 
The Cultural Creative Industry 
Bangkok Fashion City (BFC) 
Under the planning off the Ministry 
of Industry, the BFC integrated the six 
biggest private corporations in Thailand 
and seeks to transform Bangkok into a 
regional hub for fashion by 2007 and an 
international hub for fashion by 2012, 
through the joint corporation of the state 
and private sector. BFC can be regarded 
as a very important cultural creative 
industrial policy that is quite successful in 
the Thaksin governmant. With the 
promotion of fashion in Bangkok, 
Thailand’s design industry exceeded 300 
billion baht in export while fashion textile 
export exceeded 130 billion baht, grossing 
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20% growth per annum. The entire plan 
was to be carried out from 2003 to 2007. 
However, with Thaksin’s resignation on 
September 19, 2006 following a military 
coup, the BFC proposal came to an end, 
as the succeeding military government 
did not put forth its support. 
Thailand Creative and Design Center 
(TCDC) 
Thaksin once expressed that 
“creativity can create job opportunities 
and increase income; although creativity 
and economics seem like two different 
things, we can combine the two 
concepts.” Under the thinking of 
“creative economics,” the Thai 
government established the TCDC on 
September 2, 2003 and the center went 
into work on November 14, 2005. Beside 
the goal of providing professionals with 
the latest information in the industry, 
TCDC aimed to provide average citizens 
with creativity and design related 
knowledge. Accordingly, TCDC was 
established on the six floor of the 
Emporium shopping center in the heart of 
Bangkok (TCDC 2009). Even though the 
TCDC was established with government 
support, the fact does not diminish its 
effect of closing the gap between the 
design industry and average citizens, 
bringing the concept of design into the 
heart of the Thai people. Based on its 
success, the TCDC stepped out of 
Bangkok and established “Mini TCDCs” 
in other regions of the country, spreading 
the concept of creativity across Thailand. 
One Tambon, One Product (OTOP) 
The idea of OTOP came from the 
Japanese concept of “one village one 
product” (OVOP), an idea proposed by 
Oita Governor Hiramatsu Marihiko in 
1979. Thailand’s OTOP concept 
originated from Thaksin’s plan to 
stimulate rural and urban economy in 
2001. The Thai government allocated one 
million baht to 45,000 tambons across the 
country, in hopes of helping them 
develop products of local characteristic 
and move away from poverty. When the 
OTOP project began in 2001, the project 
grossed only 215 million baht in sales 
income. By 2003, OTOP sales reached 33 
billion baht, with the figure rising to 46 
billion baht in 2004 and 50 billion baht in 
2005. Small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) that participated in OTOP reached 
35,179, evidence of the project’s success. 
Unfortunately, like the BFC, the OTOP 
project terminated after Thaksin’s 
resignation, as it also failed to garner the 
support of the succeeding government. 
The Telecommunication Industry 
Thailand’s rapid economic 
development since the 1980s caused a 
corresponding growth in demand for 
telecommunication facilities in the 
country. As Thailand’s two state 
corporations, the Telephone Organization 
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of Thailand (TOT) and the 
Communication Authority of Thailand 
(CAT), could not satisfy increasing 
demand, the telecommunication industry 
began to face difficulties in the late 1980s. 
The Thai government was forced to 
consider serious reform in the 
telecommunication industry. In this 
context, the government sought the help 
of the private sector to provide better 
telecommunication service and combined 
such help with the country’s second wave 
of privatization in 1984. Since the late 
eighties, Thailand initiated the first phase 
of telecommunication reforms and 
opened up the sector to private 
participation through the scheme of 
Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO). 
Telecommunication Reform Phase I (late 
1980s - 1997) 
Thailand’s rapid economic growth 
since the 1980s greatly boosted the 
demand for telecommunication service in 
the country. As a result, Chaticahi 
Choonhaven undertook the task of sector 
reform once he entered office. Under the 
support of TOT and CAT, the Chaticahi 
administration issued more than 22 
telecommunication licenses, including 
four special concessions for fixed-line 
telephone and mobile phone. However, 
the process of issuing licenses and 
concessions was hampered by huge 
controversies (McCargo and Pathmanand 
2005, p.27). 
Telecommunication Reform Phase II 
(1997- present) 
After liberalization of the 
telecommunication industry, the TOT and 
CAT played both the role of player and 
referee. At a time when the establishment 
of the National Telecommunication 
Commission (NTC) was under planning, 
privatization of the TOT and CAT became 
the main issue of concern in the second 
phase of reform. Thaksin’s original plan 
was to have both TOT and CAT 
corporatize first before merging and 
undergoing privatization (Pathmanand 
and Baker 2008). According to the 
Telecommunications  Master plan passed 
in 1997, privatization of TOT and CAT 
should be completed before October 2000. 
However, the privatization process was 
severely delayed and only the first step of 
TOT and CAT corporatization was 
completed before Thaksin was thrown 
out of office. The succeeding government 
became busy attending to political 
instability and did not prioritize the 
privatization of TOT and CAT. It is 
expected that TOT and CAT privatization 
still have a long way to go. 
The Response of Regionalization 
The Role of East Asian Countries 
After the 1985 Plaza Accord, the 
Japanese yen appreciated sharply, rising 
from 236 yen per dollar to 125 yen per 
dollar. The sharp rise of the yen caused 
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Japanese manufacturers to move out of 
the country in search of new investment 
grounds. Thailand became the top choice 
for foreign investment by Japan’s 
automobile companies. With time, the 
phenomenon of Japanese growing 
dominance over the automobile industry 
in Thailand became apparent (Busser 
2008). On the other hand, Thai 
government support for the automobile 
industry was another important reason 
for Japanese investment in the country 
(Takayasu and Mori 2004). In 2004, Japan 
became the top importer and second 
largest exporter of Thailand while 
Thailand was Japan’s tenth biggest 
importer and sixth biggest exporter 
(MOEA 2006). 
As the development of globalization 
stagnated, many countries in the Asia-
Pacific began to move towards 
regionalization and the pursuit of free 
trade agreements (FTAs). Thailand and 
Japan have long maintained a close 
economic relationship. The Japan-
Thailand Economic Partnership 
Agreement (JTEPA) signed in 2005 clearly 
pointed out that Japan would support 
Thailand as the “Detroit of Asia” through 
joint cooperation in the automobile 
industry. Furthermore, the JETPA also 
mentions the plan for joint establishment 
of the Automotive Human Resources 
Development Institute (AHRDI), a 
concept that aims to improve the 
international competitiveness of the Thai 
automobile industry through human 
resource development. As the above 
discussion suggests, it is clear that the 
JETPA will improve the trade relationship 
between Japan and Thailand, especially 
the real interest of the automobile 
industry in both countries. 
Regional Economic Integration 
Tariff reduction under regional 
economic integration provides major 
benefits for the economic development of 
Thailand. By 2003, Thailand’s average 
tariff rate had fallen to 4.64% (Puntasen, 
Lewnanonchai, & Rattanawarinchai 2008). 
The development of Thailand’s 
automobile industry is significantly 
related to free trade agreements with 
countries such as Japan, China, South 
Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India. 
At the same time, other Southeast Asian 
countries served as big export markets for 
Thai automobile. The export of 
automobile related products in Thailand 
has always remained as the country’s 
second largest exported good. In 2009, 
automobile exports reached 11.1 billion 
USD, accounting for 7.29% of total export. 
In 2010, as a result of Thailand’s economic 
recovery, automobile exports increased to 
17.7 billion USD, accounting for 9.07% of 
total export. 
On the other hand, besides the 
mentioning of bilateral cooperation in the 
automobile industry in the JETPA, tariff 
reduction of automobile related goods is 
also contained in free trade agreements 
72  
 
The Political Economy of Industrial Development in Thailand 
 
between Thailand and Australia, India, 
and New Zealand. Beginning from 
January 2005, Australia reduced or 
eliminated tariffs on passenger and 
commercial vehicles, as well as trucks. 
Tariff on related vehicle parts was 
reduced from 42% to 20% and completely 
eliminated by January 2010. In short, FTA 
between Thailand and Australia 
generated a complementary, rather than a 
zero-sum, relationship (Chaksirinont 2005, 
p.40-44). In September 2006, India agreed 
to reduce tariff on Thai automobile parts 
as well. Finally, beginning January 2010 
as well, New Zealand reduced or 
removed tariffs on passenger and 
commercial vehicles, trucks and related 
vehicle parts produced in Thailand 
(Office of Industrial Economics 2006, 
p.19). The automobile industry can be 
regarded as the biggest benefactor of 
regional integration. 
The Response of Localization 
The Role of Government 
Effective development of the cultural 
creative industry demands various 
government policy and institutional 
support, which can be discussed on three 
levels: policy, production, and marketing. 
First, in terms of policy, Thailand’s 
cultural creative policies are largely 
defined by the National Economic and 
Social Development Board (NESDB), the 
Ministry of Culture (MOC), the Ministry 
of Science and Technology (MOST) and 
the Ministry of Education (MOE). Besides 
official ministries and departments, the 
Prime Minister’s policy direction has 
important influence on the cultural 
creative industry as well. 
Second, in terms of the production, 
the process can be further divided into 
four sections: 
(1) Finance: Financial assistance to businesses 
and individuals is jointly undertaken by 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Board 
of Investment (BOI) and the Office of 
Small and Medium Enterprises 
Promotion (OSMEP). 
(2) Knowledge and technology: Research and 
development of the cultural creative 
industry is undertaken by the National 
Science and Technology Development 
Agency (NSTDA), the Thailand Research 
Fund (TRF) and the Software Industry 
Promotion Agency (SIPA), as well as 
other research institutes and universities. 
These agencies seek to increase the 
production and added valued of cultural 
creative products. 
(3) Quality management and standard 
control: The quality and standard of 
cultural creative production is monitored 
by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) and the Tourism 
Authority of Thailand (TAT). 
(4) Human resource: The training and 
development of artisans and cultural 
creative talent is performed by the 
Community Development Department 
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(CDD), the Department of Intellectual 
Property (DIP) and universities and 
colleges in the country. 
Finally, in terms of marketing, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the 
Department of Export Promotion (DEP), 
the Department of Business Development 
(DBD) and the Thai Tribal Crafts 
Organization are responsible for the 
worldwide promotion of Thai cultural 
creative products and services. 
The above description suggests that 
in terms of the cultural creative industry, 
the main role of the Thai government is to 
carry out policies that aim at 
development of the industry 
(Termpittayapaisith 2007).  
The Importance of Economic 
Development 
After the succession of Abhisit Vejjaji 
as PM in 2008, Thailand pushed forward 
various projects aimed at promotion of 
the cultural creative industry. August 31, 
2009 marked the official takeoff of the 
“Creative Thailand” project. On 
September 10, Thailand established the 
National Creative Economy Policy 
Committee (NCEPC) with PM Abhisit 
leading the committee and advisor to the 
PM office, Apirak Kosayothin, serving as 
consultant to the committee. Building on 
the tide of actions towards development 
of the cultural creative industry, the Thai 
government announced that 2010 will be 
the “Creative Economy Year” of Thailand, 
an action that demonstrates the 
incumbent government’s commitment 
towards the promotion of Thai culture. 
 At the inaugural NCEPC meeting on 
October 7, 2009, Abhisit expressed his 
aspiration for Thailand to become the hub 
for creative economics in Southeast Asia. 
In addition, he also expressed his 
ambition for a major increase from twelve 
to twenty percent in creative economy as 
a proportion of GDP. In order to 
accomplish the above goals, the Thai 
government integrated creative economic 
policies into its national economic 
recovery programs, the Thai Khem 
Khaeng and the Tenth National Economic 
and Social Development Plan (NESDP) 
(Inside Thailand 2009). Abhisit also 
pushed for inclusion of the concept of 
creative economy into the Eleventh 
NESDP (2012-2016), in hopes of 
establishing a cultural creative economy 
in Thailand and greatly boosting the 
significance of the cultural creative 
industry as a driving force of GDP by 
2012. 
The Tenth NESDP is hinged on the 
guiding principle of sufficiency. Under 
the principle, the NEDSP aims to achieve 
three main goals: people centered 
development model; a balance between 
economic, social and environmental 
capital; and the establishment of a happy 
and green society. In order to meet the 
above goals, the Thai government hopes 
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to increase the influence of its knowledge 
based economy through the re-
organization of different sectors. The 
agricultural, manufacturing and service 
sectors now all emphasize the concept of 
creativity. 
Political Instability and State-Business 
Relations 
The Impact of Political Instability 
Thaksin’s leadership style and 
personal business relations gave rise to 
strong popular discontent in the country. 
Thailand fell into political instability since 
the second half of 2005. After more than a 
year of political distress, on September 19, 
2006, the Thai military staged the first 
military coup in the country since 1992 
and dismissed Thaksin (Montesano 2007). 
Supporters of Thaksin formed the United 
Front of Democracy against Dictatorship 
(UDD) and expressed their discontent 
against the military government. The 
UDD and the People’s Alliance for 
Democracy (PAD), led by Sondi 
Limthongkul, subsequently initiated 
massive protests against the government. 
It is clear that the military coup did not 
solve the political distress of Thailand, 
but rather deepened the country’s 
political division. 
Since 2005, seven candidates 
succeeded as Prime Minister of Thailand: 
Thaksin Shinawatra, Surayud Chulanont, 
Samak Sundaravej, Somchai Wongsawat, 
Abhisit Vejjajiva, Yingluck Shinawatra, 
and Prayuth Chan-o-cha. Many serious 
conflicts broke out during this period of 
frequent successions. In November 2007, 
the so called “Yellow Shirts” occupied 
Suvarnabhumi and Don Muang airport 
and was determined to force Somchai out 
of office. In April 2009, the “Red Shirts” 
blocked the ASEAN Summit Meeting in 
Pattaya. On March 12, 2010, the Red 
Shirts launched a million people march 
on the streets of Bangkok and occupied 
the Ratchaprasong area for more than two 
months. The Thai security forces 
responded with two massive crackdowns 
on April 10 and May 16-19, causing the 
more than 90 deaths and 1,800 casualties.  
In 2011, PM Abhist decided to 
dissolve the parliament and hold an 
election. The Puea Thai Party led by 
Thaksin’s younger sister Yingluck 
triumphed in the election and Yingluck 
succeeded as the PM of Thailand. After 
two years in office, in 2013, Yingluck 
proposed an amnesty bill. The bill was 
opposed by former Deputy Prime 
Minister Suthep Thaugsuban, who would 
establish the People’s Democratic Reform 
Committee (PDRC) and generate 
instability by initiating large scale 
demonstrations on the streets of Bangkok. 
In the end, on May 22, 2014, the Thai 
military once again staged a coup and 
took over executive and legislative 
powers of the state. The military expects 
to initiate one to two years of reform 
before carrying out popular elections and 
returning the state to the Thai people.   
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Frequent overturn of the Thai regime 
has an impact on the sustainable 
development of the cultural creative 
industry. Although Thaksin’s BFC project 
was not without controversies, the project 
contributed to the development of 
Thailand’s cultural creative industry. 
Thaksin’s exit from office and the military 
government’s succession ended the 
project and caused developments in the 
fashion industry to grind to a sudden halt. 
Similarly, the OTOP project achieved 
some appealing results but was forced to 
change its name after the end of Thaksin’s 
office, which generated a succession 
problem of Thailand’s cultural creative 
policy. 
Furthermore, political distress in 
2009 also had a severe impact on 
Thailand’s movie industry. In 2008, as 
many as 526 foreign film production 
teams worked in Thailand and generated 
an estimated income of 2 billion baht. 
However, in 2009, as a result of political 
chaos in Thailand, despite the slight drop 
in foreign teams working in Thailand to 
496, the income declined significantly to 
0.8 billion baht, which severely crippled 
the development of the Thai movie 
industry (Thailand Investment Review 
2010). The movie industry is a good 
example of the impact of politics on the 
cultural creative industry in Thailand. 
The Impact of State-Business Relations 
In an interview in 1997, Jasmine 
Group founder Adisai Bodharamik 
pointed out that in Thailand, business 
depends on connections (Pananond 1999). 
On the other hand, UCOM president 
Boonchai Benjarongkul also expressed 
that connections is always the most 
important factor (Niyomsilpa 2000, p.76).  
Thailand’s main telecommunication 
groups also hold similar view and try 
hard to maintain various connections 
including state agencies, political figures 
and the military. 
In the past, nearly all of the 
management level personnel in 
Thailand’s state enterprises consisted of 
political patronage or reward. Moreover, 
as a result of the instability of Thai 
politics, the government’s short terms 
caused constant changes on the 
management level in state enterprises, 
which further affected corporate 
performance significantly. In short, 
excessive political intervention exists in 
Thailand’s telecommunication industry, 
which severely hampers sector reform 
(Thailand Development Research 
Institute 2002). 
After Thaksin’s entry into office, 
Thailand’s telecommunication industry 
underwent change and key figures from 
major conglomerates joined the Thaksin 
administration, including the chairman of 
CP Group, Dhanin Chearavanont, who 
served as advisor to the Ministry of 
Finance, and Jasmine Group founder, 
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Adisai Bodharamik, who served as the 
first Minister of Commerce (Kritsophon 
2002, p.47). 
On the other hand, the Thai 
government formed a special task force 
that aimed to realize the country’s 
promise to liberalize the 
telecommunication industry under the 
WTO. The task force introduced a 
proposal that sought to balance 
competition in the telecommunication 
industry. The proposal was strongly 
opposed by an incumbent member of 
parliament, who is also a close friend of 
Thaksin, and failed to come to light. It is 
generally believed that opposition was to 
ensure the dominant advantage of 
Advanced Info Service (AIS) at the time. 
It is clear that Thaksin exploited his 
connections in both the state and business 
communities to extract personal interests. 
Thaksin played an important role before 
and after sector reforms, whether in the 
license granting period, after the financial 
crisis or during his office. However, it is 
undeniable that state-business 
collaboration curtailed the national 
strategy to use the telecommunication 
industry for economic recovery. 
Conclusion 
Since suffering from the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997, successive 
governments in Thailand all deemed 
economic development and recovery as a 
state priority. At the same time, 
discussions of regionalization and 
localization appeared, and Thailand 
hoped to respond to globalization 
through the dual strategies of 
regionalization and localization. 
Although Thailand’s dual strategies 
succeeded in helping the automobile and 
cultural creative industries respond to the 
challenges of globalization, political 
instability beginning in the second half of 
2005 and Thaksin’s personal connections 
damaged part of the cultural creative 
industry and caused reforms in the 
telecommunication industry to fail 
completely. However, the most important 
factors in the future are Thaksin and the 
current political situation. Thaksin played 
an important role not only in the 
telecommunication industry, but also all 
the industries in Thailand. If Thaksin 
return to Thailand will definitely affect 
the development of various industries. 
Meanwhile, The attitude of military 
government toward industrial 
development also determines the future 
of Thai political economy. 
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